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Broad Outline
• Real-life Motivational Examples  (Why?)
• Trust :  Characteristics and Related Concepts (What?)
• Trust Ontology (What?)
– Type, Value, Process, Scope
• Gleaning Trustworthiness (How?) + Robustness to Attack
– Practical Examples of Trust Metrics
– Comparative Analysis of Bayesian Approaches to Trust 
• Research Challenges (Why-What-How?) 
– APPLICATIONS: E.g., Sensor Networks, Social Networks, Interpersonal
– ISSUES: E.g., Credibility, Scalability, Resiliency (Distributed Consensus)
• Details of Bayesian Approach to Multi-level Trust
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Real-life Motivational Examples
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(Why track trust?)
Interpersonal
• With which neighbor should we leave our
children over the weekend when we are
required to be at the hospital?
• Who should be named as a guardian for our
children in the Will?
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Social
• To click or not to click a http://bit.ly-URL
• To rely or not to rely on a product review
(when only a few reviews are present, or the
reviews are conflicting)?
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Sensors
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• Weather sensor network predicts a potential tornado in
the vicinity of a city.
• Issue: Should we mobilize emergency response teams
ahead of time?
• Van’s TCS (Traction Control System) indicator light came
on intermittently, while driving.
• Issue: Which is faulty: the indicator light or the traction
control system?
• Van’s Check Engine light came on, while driving.
• Issue: Which is faulty: the indicator light or the
transmission control system ?
Man-Machine Hybrid
Collaborative Systems
The 2002 Uberlingen Mid-air Collision (between
Bashkirian Airlines Flight 2937 and DHL Flight
611) occurred because the pilot of one of the
planes trusted the human air traffic controller
(who was ill-informed about the unfolding
situation), instead of the electronic TCAS system
(which was providing conflicting but correct
course of action to avoid collision).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_Uberlingen_mid-air_collision
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Man-Machine Hybrid
Collaborative Systems
In hybrid situations, artificial agents
should reason about the
trustworthiness and deceptive
actions of their human counter
parts. People and agents in virtual
communities will deceive, and will
be deceived.
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Castelfranchi and Tan, 2002 
Common Issues and Context
• Uncertainty
– About the validity of a claim or
assumption
• Vulnerability
– Past Experience
• Need for action
Critical decision with potential for loss
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Why Track Trust?
• In Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs),
trust enables dynamic determination of
secure routes.
– Efficiency: To improve throughput
• By avoiding nodes facing bad channel condition
– Robustness : To detect malicious nodes
• When attackers enter the network in spite of
secure key distribution/authentication
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Why Track Trust?
• In sensor networks, it allows detection of
faults and transient bad behaviors due to
environmental effects.
• In cognitive radio networks, it can enable
selection of optimal channel (less noisy,
less crowded channels).
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Why Track Trust?
• In E-commerce:
–To predict future behavior in a
reliable manner.
–To incentivize “good” behavior and
discourage “bad” behavior.
–To detect malicious entities.
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The Two Sides of Trust 
• Trustor assesses trustee for
dependability.
• Trustee casts itself in positive light to
trustor.
• Trust is a function of trustee's
perceived trustworthiness and the
trustor's propensity to trust.
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Trust and Related Concepts
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(What is trust?)
Trust Definition : Psychology slant
Trust is the psychological state
comprising a willingness to be
vulnerable in expectation of a
valued result.
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Ontology of Trust, Huang and Fox, 2006
Josang et al’s Decision Trust
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Trust Definition : Psychology slant
Trust in a person is a commitment to
an action based on a belief that the
future actions of that person will
lead to good outcome.
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Golbeck and Hendler, 2006
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Trust Definition : Probability slant
Trust (or, symmetrically, distrust)
is a level of subjective probability
with which an agent assesses
that another agent will perform
a particular action, both before
and independently of such an
action being monitored …
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Can we Trust Trust?, Diego Gambetta, 2000
Josang et al’s  Reliability Trust
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Trustworthiness Definition :
Psychology Slant
Trustworthiness is a collection of
qualities of an agent that leads them
to be considered as deserving of
trust from others (in one or more
environments, under different
conditions, and to different degrees).
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http://www.iarpa.gov/rfi_trust.html
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Trustworthiness Definition : 
Probability slant
Trustworthiness is the objective
probability that the trustee
performs a particular action on
which the interests of the
trustor depend.
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Solhaug et al, 2007
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Trust vs Trustworthiness : My View
Trust  Disposition
Depends on 
Potentially Quantified Trustworthiness Qualities 
+
Context-based Trust Threshold   
E.g.*, In the context of trusting strangers, people in the
West will trust for lower levels of trustworthiness than
people in the Gulf.
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*Bohnet et al, 5/2010
21
Reputation is Overloaded
Community-based Reputation
vs. 
Temporal Reputation 
(Cf.  Community endorsement of merit, 
achievement, reliability, etc.)
(Cf. Sustained good behavior over time elicits 
temporal reputation-based trust.)
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Trust vs. Reputation  
Reputation can be a basis for trust.
However, they are different notions*.
• I trust you because of your good reputation.
• I trust you despite your bad reputation.
• Do you still trust Toyota brand?
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*Josang et al, 2007
26
Trust  vs. (Community-based) 
Reputation  
Trust :: Reputation 
:::: 
Local :: Global 
::::
Subjective :: Objective 
(Cf.  Security refers to resistance to attacks.)
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Trust is well-known, 
but is not well-understood.
The utility of a notion 
testifies not to its clarity but 
rather to the philosophical 
importance of clarifying it.
-- Nelson Goodman 
(Fact, Fiction and Forecast, 1955)
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Trust Ontology
June 1, 2015 Trust Management: T. K. Prasad 30
(What is trust?)
Illustration of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning:
Relating Semantics to Data Structures and Algorithms
Example Trust Network -
Different Trust Links with Local Order on out-links 
• Alice trusts Bob for recommending good car
mechanic.
• Bob trusts Dick to be a good car mechanic.
• Charlie does not trust Dick to be a good car
mechanic.
• Alice trusts Bob more than Charlie, for
recommending good car mechanic.
• Alice trusts Charlie more than Bob, for
recommending good baby sitter.
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*Thirunarayan et al,  IICAI 2009
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Digression: Illustration of Knowledge 
Representation and Reasoning
• Abstract and encode clearly delineated “subarea” 
of knowledge in a formal language. 
– Trust Networks => node-labeled, edge-labeled 
directed graph (DATA STRUCTURES)
• Specify the meaning in terms of how “network 
elements” relate to or compose with each other. 
– Semantics of Trust, Trust Metrics => using logic or 
probabilistic basis, constraints, etc.  (SEMANTICS)
• Develop efficient graph-based procedures 
– Trust  value determination/querying  (INFERENCE 
ALGORITHMS)
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(In recommendations)
(For capacity to act)
(For lack of 
capacity to act)
Trust Ontology*
6-tuple representing a trust relationship:
{type, value, scope, process}
Type – Represents the nature of trust relationship.
Value – Quantifies trustworthiness for comparison.
Scope – Represents applicable context for trust.
Process – Represents the method by which the value is    
created and maintained.
trustor trustee
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*Anantharam et al,  NAECON 2010
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Trust Ontology:
Trust Type,  Trust Value, and Trust Scope
 Trust Type*
 Referral Trust – Agent a1 trusts agent a2’s ability to
recommend another agent.
 (Non-)Functional Trust – Agent a1 (dis)trusts agent a2’s
ability to perform an action.
 Cf. ** trust in belief vs. trust in performance
 Trust Value
 E.g., Star rating, numeric rating, or partial ordering.
 Trust Scope*
 E.g., Reliable forwarding of data.
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*Thirunarayan et al,  IICAI 2009
** Huang and Fox, 2006
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Multidimensional 
Trust Scopes in Ecommerce
• Trust in a vendor to deliver on 
commitments.
• Trust in vendor's ethical use of 
consumer data.
• Trust in Internet communication being 
secure.
• Plus: Propensity/Disposition to trust 
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Trust Ontology: 
Trust  Process
 Represents the method by which the value
is computed and maintained.
 Primitive (for functional and referral links)*
 Reputation – based on past behavior (temporal) or
community opinion.
 Policy – based on explicitly stated constraints.
 Evidence – based on seeking/verifying evidence.
 Provenance – based on lineage information.
 Composite (for admissible paths)**
 Propagation (Chaining and Aggregation)
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*Anantharam et al,  NAECON 2010
**Thirunarayan et al, IICAI 2009
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Trust Ontology
38
Unified Illustration of Trust Processes
Scenario : Hiring Web Search Engineer - An R&D Position
Various Processes :
• (Temporal-based) Reputation: Past job experiences
• (Community-based) Reputation: Multiple 
references
• Policy-based: Score cutoffs on screening test
• Provenance-based: Department/University of 
graduation
• Evidence-based: Multiple interviews (phone, on-
site, R&D team)
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Deception
• Deception is the betrayal of trust.
–Ironically, trust makes us prone to 
deception. 
–Knowing what features are used to 
glean trustworthiness can also assist 
in avoiding detection while deceiving. 
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Gleaning Trustworthiness : 
Practical Examples
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(How to determine trustworthiness?)
Trust Metrics and Trust Models
• Trust Metric => How is primitive trust
represented and computed?
• E.g., Real number, Finite levels, Partial Order.
• Trust Model => How is composite trust
computed or propagated?
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Y. L. Sun, et al, 2/2008
Trust Models : Ideal Approach
• Capture semantics of trust using
– axioms for trust propagation, or
– catalog of equivalent trust networks.
• Develop trust computation rules
for propagation (that is, chaining
and aggregation) that satisfy the
axioms or equivalence relation.
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Direct Trust : Functional and Referral 
Reputation-based Process
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(Using large number of observations)
Using Large Number of Observations
• Over time (<= Referral + Functional) : 
Temporal Reputation-based Process
– Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks
– Sensor Networks
• Quantitative information
(Numeric data)
• Over agents (<= Referral + Functional) : 
Community Reputation-based Process
– Product Rating Systems
• Quantitative + Qualitative information 
(Numeric + text data)
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Desiderata for Trustworthiness 
Computation Function
• Initialization Problem : How do we get initial value?
• Update Problem : How do we reflect the observed
behavior in the current value dynamically?
• Trusting Trust* Issue: How do we mirror uncertainty
in our estimates as a function of observations?
• Law of Large Numbers: The average of the results obtained from a
large number of trials should be close to the expected value.
• Efficiency Problem : How do we store and update
values efficiently?
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*Ken Thompson’s Turing Award Lecture: “Reflections on Trusting Trust”
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Mathematical Background
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Beta PDF   for  Reputation
Beta-distribution : Gently
• Consider a (potentially unfair) coin that comes up
HEADS with probability p and TAILS with probability
(1 – p).
• Suppose we perform ( r + s ) coin tosses and the coin
turns up with HEADS r times and with TAILS s times.
• What is the best estimate of the distribution of the
probability p given these observations?
=> Beta-distribution with parameters ( r+1, s+1 )
June 1, 2015 Trust Management: T. K. Prasad
f(p; r+1, s+1)
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Beta Probability Density Function(PDF)
x is a probability, 
so it ranges from 0-1
If the prior distribution of x is
uniform, then the beta
distribution gives posterior
distribution of x after
observing a-1 occurrences
of event with probability x
and b-1 occurrences of the
complementary event with
probability (1-x).
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a= 5
b= 5
a= 1
b= 1
a= 2
b= 2
a= 10
b= 10
a = b, so the PDF’s are symmetric w.r.t 0.5.
Note that the graphs get narrower as (a+b) increases.
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a= 5
b= 25
a= 5
b= 10
a= 25
b= 5
a= 10
b= 5
a ≠ b, so the PDF’s are asymmetric w.r.t . 0.5.
Note that the graphs get narrower as (a+b) increases.
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Beta-distribution - Applicability
• Dynamic trustworthiness can be
characterized using beta probability
distribution function gleaned from total
number of correct (supportive) r = (a-1)
and total number of erroneous
(opposing) s = (b-1) observations so far.
• Overall trustworthiness (reputation) is its
mean: a/a +b
June 1, 2015 Trust Management: T. K. Prasad 55
Why Beta-distribution?
• Intuitively satisfactory, mathematically precise, and
computationally tractable
• Initialization Problem : Assumes that all probability values
are equally likely.
• Update Problem : Updates (a, b) by incrementing a for
every correct (supportive) observation and b for every
erroneous (opposing) observation.
• Trusting Trust Issue: The graph peaks around the mean, and
the variance diminishes as the number of observations
increase, if the agent is well-behaved.
• Efficiency Problem: Only two numbers stored/updated.
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Information Theoretic Interpretation 
of Trustworthiness Probability 
• Intuitively, probability values of 0 and 1 imply
certainty, while probability value of 0.5 implies
a lot of uncertainty.
• This can be formalized by mapping probability
in [0,1] to trust value in [–1,1], using
information theoretic approach.
June 1, 2015 Trust Management: T. K. Prasad
Y. L. Sun, et al, 2/2008
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Information Theoretic Interpretation 
of Trustworthiness Probability 
• T(trustee : trustor, action) =
if 0.5 <= p
then 1 – H(p) /* 0.5 <= p <= 1 */
else H(p) – 1 /* 0 <= p <= 0.5 */
where
H(p) = – p log2(p) – (1 – p) log2(1 – p)
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Plot of T(trustee : trustor, action) vs. p
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Direct Trust : Functional
Policy-based Process
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(Using Trustworthiness Qualities)
General Approach to Trust Assessment
• Domain dependent qualities for determining
trustworthiness
– Based on Content / Data
– Based on External Cues / Metadata
• Domain independent mapping to trust values
or levels
– Quantification through abstraction and
classification
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Example: Wikipedia  Articles
• Quality (content-based)
– Appraisal of information provenance
• References to peer-reviewed publication
• Proportion of paragraphs with citation
– Article size
• Credibility (metadata-based)
– Author connectivity
– Edit pattern and development history
• Revision count
• Proportion of reverted edits - (i) normal  (ii) due to vandalism
• Mean time between edits
• Mean edit length.
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Sai Moturu, 8/2009
(cont’d)
• Quantification of Trustworthiness 
– Based on Dispersion Degree Score 
(Extent of deviation from mean)
• Evaluation Metric
– Ranking based on trust level (determined from 
trustworthiness scores), and compared to gold 
standard classification using Normalized 
Discounted Cumulative Gain (NDCG) 
• RATINGS: featured, good, standard, cleanup, and stub. 
• NDCG: error penalty proportional to the rank.
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Indirect Trust : Referral + Functional
Variety of Trust Metrics and Models  
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(Using Propagation – Chaining and Aggregation over Paths)
Trust Propagation Frameworks
• Chaining, Aggregation, and Overriding
• Trust Management
• Abstract properties of operators
• Reasoning with trust
• Matrix-based trust propagation
• The Beta-Reputation System
• Algebra on opinion = (belief, disbelief, uncertainty)
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Guha et al., 2004
Richardson et al, 2003
Josang and Ismail, 2002
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Massa-Avesani, 2005
Bintzios et al, 2006
Golbeck – Hendler, 2006 Sun et al, 2006
Thirunarayan et al, 2009
Trust Propagation Algorithms
• Top-down
• 1: Extract trust DAG (eliminate cycles)
• 2: Predict trust score for a source in a target by
aggregating trust scores in target inherited
from source’s “trusted” parents weighted with
trust value in the corresponding parent.
–Computation is level-by-level
–Alternatively, computation can be based on
paths.
June 1, 2015 Trust Management: T. K. Prasad
Golbeck – Hendler, 2006
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Trust Propagation Algorithms
• Bottom-up
• 1: Extract trust DAG (eliminate cycles)
• 2: Predict trust score for a source in a target by
aggregating trust scores in target inherited
from target’s “trusted” neighbors weighted
with trust value in the corresponding neighbor.
–Computation is level-by-level
–Alternatively, computation can be based on
paths.
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Massa-Avesani, 2005
Bintzios et al, 2006
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Top-down vs Bottom-up (visualized)
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source
Target
source
Target
w3
w2
w1
w3w2w1
Trust-Network
Example: Comparative Analysis
June 1, 2015 Trust Management: T. K. Prasad 75
Different Interpretation:
q distrusts s (Bintzios et al’s)
vs
q has no information about 
the trustworthiness of s (our’s, 
Golbeck  rounding algorithm)
Indirect Trust : Referral + Functional
Variety of Bayesian Trust Models  
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With Applications to Mobile Ad hoc Networks
Wireless Sensor Networks, etc.
Direct Trust : Functional and Referral  
• Direct Trust for Packet Forwarding
• S = Number of packets forwarded
• F = Number of packets dropped
• S + F = Total number of requests for packet forwarding
• Direct Trust for Recommendations
• S = Number of times observed direct trust for packet
forwarding approximates expected indirect trust for
packet forwarding (trust over transit path : r+f)
• F = Number of times observed direct trust for packet
forwarding does not approximate expected indirect
trust for packet forwarding (trust over transit path : r+f)
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Indirect Trust : Functional and Referral  
• Indirect Trust for Packet Forwarding
– Used when direct trust is not available
»(overriding behavior)
• Chain links for a path from a recommender to the target
– Multiplicative
• Aggregate over multiple (parallel) paths from
recommenders to the target
– Unclear, in general
• Indirect Trust for Recommendations
• Obtained implicitly through computed referral trust
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Trust Propagation Rules :
Axioms for Trust Models
Rule 1: Concatenation 
propagation does 
not increase trust.
Rule 2: Multipath 
propagation does 
not reduce trust.
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Sun et al, 2006
|T(A1,C1)|  <= min(|R(A1,B1)|, |T(B1,C1)|)
0<=T(A1,C1) <= T(A2,C2)  for R1 > 0 and T2 >= 0
0>=T(A1,C1) >= T(A2,C2)  for R1 > 0 and T2 < 0
(cont’d)
Rule 3: Trust based on multiple referrals from a 
single source should not be higher than that 
from independent sources.
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Sun et al, 2006
0<=T(A1,C1) <= T(A2,C2)  for R1, R2, R3 > 0 and T2 >= 0
0>=T(A1,C1) >= T(A2,C2)  for R1, R2, R3 > 0 and T2 < 0
Trust Propagation Rules :
Implementation
June 1, 2015 Trust Management: T. K. Prasad
Sun et al, 2006
1 2
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Trust Paths Visualized for Scalability:
Semantics unclear based on Sun et al’s spec  
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Bottom-up computation
reflects our needs better?
Trust : Functional and Referral  
• Direct Trust for Primitive Actions based on
• S = Number of success actions
• F = Number of failed actions
• S + F = Total number of actions
• Indirect Trust via Recommendations based on
summing direct experiences of recommenders
• Sk = Number of success actions for k
th recommender
• Fk = Number of failed actions for k
th recommender
• No chaining for referrals
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Denko-Sun 2008
Cumulative Trust using 
Direct Experience and Recommendations  
• Cumulative Trust is obtained by using total
number of success actions and failed actions
from direct experience (ns,nu) and from i
(indirect experiences through)
recommendations (ns
r,nu
r).
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Contents of [Ganeriwal et al, 2007] Paper
• (a,b)-parameters to compute trust of i in j is
obtained by combining direct observations
(aj,bj) with indirect observations (aj
k,bj
k) from
k weighted by (ak,bk) using [Josang-Ismail,
2002] chaining/discounting rule.
• Obtains cumulative trust by combining direct trust from
a functional link and indirect trusts using paths
containing one referral link and one functional link.
• However, it does not distinguish functional and referral
trust.
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Security Issues: 
Threats and Vulnerabilities
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Attacks and Robustness Analysis
Attacks
• Trust Management is an attractive target for 
malicious nodes.
 Bad mouthing attack (Defamation)
 Dishonest recommendations on good nodes (calling them 
bad)
 Ballot stuffing attack (Collusion)
 Dishonest recommendations on bad nodes (calling them 
good)
 Sybil attack
 Creating Fake Ids
 Newcomer attack
 Registering as new nodes
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Attacks
• Inconsistency in time-domain
 On-Off attack
 Malicious node behaves good and bad alternatively to 
avoid detection
 Sleeper attack 
 Malicious node acquires high trust by behaving good 
and then striking by behaving bad
 Inconsistency in node-domain
 Conflicting Behavior Attack 
 Provide one recommendation to one set of peers and a 
conflicting recommendation to a disjoint set of peers
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Security : Robustness w.r.t Attacks
 Bad mouthing attack
 Example: Competent nodes downplay competitions. 
 Example: Can diminish throughput due to lost capacity.
 Approach:
 Separate functional and referral trust, updating 
referral trust to track good recommendations 
 Trust composition rules ensure that low or 
negative referral trust does not impact decision
 Low trust nodes can be branded as malicious and 
avoided.  (Not viable if majority collude.)
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Security : Robustness w.r.t Attacks
 Ballot stuffing attack
 Example: Malicious nodes collude to recommend each 
other. 
 Example: Can cause unexpected loss of throughput.
 Approach:
 Feedback : Cross-check actual functional 
performance with expected behavior via referral, 
and update (reward/penalize) referral trust (in 
parent) accordingly (in addition to updating 
functional trust (in target))
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Security : Robustness w.r.t. Attacks
 Sybil attack
 Create Fake Ids to take blame for malicious 
behavior (dropping packets)
 Newcomer attack
 Register as new node to erase past history
 Approach
 Requires separate (key-based or security token-
based) authentication mechanism (with TTP) to 
overcome these attacks.
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Security : Robustness w.r.t Attacks
 On-Off attack
 Sleeper attack
 Example: Due to malice or environmental changes
 Approach:
 Use forgetting factor  (0<=b<=1): 
k good/bad actions at t1 
=   k * b(t2 – t1) good/bad actions at t2 (> t1)
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Forgetting Factor 
k good/bad actions at t1  =   k * b(t2 – t1) good/bad actions at t2 (> t1)
• High b value (0.9) enhances memorized time 
window, while low b value (0.001) reduces it.
– High b enables malicious nodes (on-off/sleeper
attackers) to use prior good actions to mask
subsequent intentional bad actions.
• Reduces reliability.
– Low b forces legitimate nodes to be avoided due
to short spurts of unintentional bad actions.
• Reduces throughput.
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Adaptive Forgetting Factor 
• Intuition: Bad actions are remembered for a 
longer duration than good actions.
• Actions performed with high trust forgotten quicker than 
actions performed with low trust.
Choose b equal to ( 1 – p )
Choose b = 0.01 when p in [0.5,1] else 0.9
 Example: Similar ideas used in Ushahidi
 Note: Effectively, more good actions are
necessary to compensate for fewer bad actions,
to recover trust.
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Security : Robustness w.r.t. Attacks
 Conflicting Behavior Attack
 Malicious node divide and conquer, by behaving
differently (resp. by providing different
recommendations) to different peers, causing
peers to provide conflicting recommendations to
source about the malicious node (resp. about
some target), reducing source’s referral trust in
some peers.
 Eventually, this causes recommendations of some peers
to be ignored incorrectly.
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Example
• Peer Node Set 1: 1, 2, 3, and 4
• Peer Node Set 2: 5, 6, 7, and 8
• Malicious node 0 behaves well towards nodes in 
Set 1 but behaves badly towards nodes in Set 2.
• When node 9 seeks recommendations from   
nodes in Set 1 U Set 2 on node 0, node 9 receives 
conflicting recommendations on malicious node 
0,  causing referral trust in nodes in Set 1 or 
nodes in Set 2 to be lowered. 
=> Eventually throughput lowered
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Security : Robustness w.r.t. Attacks
 Conflicting Behavior Attack
 Issue: Can recommenders get feedback
to reduce trust in malicious node?
Otherwise, referral trust cannot be
relied upon for detecting malicious
nodes.
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APPROACH/ 
METRIC
Trust Type /
Context
Trust Model  / 
Foundation
Robustness to 
Attacks
D[3] / 
Binary
Functional  / One Trivial chaining /
Beta-PDF
Ballot-stuffing; 
Bad-mouthing
G[4] / 
Binary
Functional /
Indistinguishable
Josang-Ismail 
discounting /
Beta-PDF
Ballot-stuffing; 
Bad-mouthing; 
Sleeper and On-
off
S[6] / 
Binary
Functional + Referral            
/ One
Limited chaining 
and aggregation /
Beta-PDF
Ballot-stuffing; 
Bad-mouthing; 
Sleeper and On-
off
Q[28] /  Multi-level Functional + Referral / 
Multiple
No  /
Bayesian 
Ad Hoc
Ballot-stuffing; 
Bad-mouthing; 
Sleeper and On-
off; Sybil
Ours / 
Multi-level
Functional + Referral / 
Multiple
No  /
Dirichlet-PDF
Ballot-stuffing; 
Bad-mouthing; 
Sleeper and On-
off; Conflicting 
behavior
Research Challenges
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(What-Why-How of trust?)
HARD PROBLEMS
Generic Directions
• Finding online substitutes for traditional cues 
to  derive measures of trust.
• Creating efficient and secure systems for 
managing and deriving trust, in order to 
support decision making.
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Robustness Issue
You can fool some of the
people all of the time, and all
of the people some of the
time, but you cannot fool all
of the people all of the time.
Abraham Lincoln, 
16th president of US (1809 - 1865)
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Trust : Social Networks   vs
Machine Networks
• In social networks such as Facebook, trust is
often subjective, while in machine networks
and social networks such as Twitter, trust can
be given an objective basis and approximated
by trustworthiness.
• Reputation is the perception that an agent
creates through past actions about its
intentions and norms.
– Reputation can be a basis for trust.
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Sensor Networks
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Strengthened Trust
Trust
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Concrete Application
• Applied Beta-PDF to Mesowest Weather Data
– Used quality flags (OK, CAUTION, SUSPECT)  
associated with observations from a sensor 
station  over time to derive  reputation of a sensor 
and trustworthiness of a perceptual theory that 
explains the observation.
– Perception cycle used data from ~800 stations, 
collected for a blizzard during 4/1-6/03.
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Concrete Application
• Perception Cycle
– http://harp.cs.wright.edu/perception/
• Trusted Perception Cycle
– http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lTxzghCjGgU
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Research Issues
• Outlier Detection
– Homogeneous Networks 
• Statistical Techniques
– Heterogeneous Networks (sensor + social)
• Domain Models
• Distinguishing  between abnormal phenomenon 
(observation), malfunction (of a sensor), and 
compromised behavior (of a sensor)
– Abnormal situations
– Faulty behaviors 
– Malicious attacks
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Ganeriwal et al, 2008
Social Networks
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Our Research
• Study semantic issues relevant to trust
• Proposed model of trust/trust metrics to 
formalize indirect trust 
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Quote
• Guha et al:
While continuous-valued trusts are 
mathematically clean, from the standpoint 
of usability,  most real-world systems will                     
in fact use discrete values at which one 
user can rate another.
• E.g., Epinions, Ebay, Amazon, Facebook, etc all 
use small sets for (dis)trust/rating values.
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Our Approach
 Trust formalized in terms of partial orders 
(with emphasis on relative magnitude)
 Local but realistic semantics
 Distinguishes functional and referral trust
 Distinguishes direct and inferred trust
Direct trust overrides conflicting inferred trust
 Represents ambiguity explicitly
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Thirunarayan et al , 2009 
Formalizing the Framework
• Given a trust network (Nodes AN, Edges RL U 
PFL U NFL with Trust Scopes TSF, Local 
Orderings ⪯ANxAN), specify when a source can 
trust, distrust, or be ambiguous about a 
target, reflecting local semantics of:
• Functional and referral trust links
• Direct and inferred trust 
• Locality
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(In recommendations)
(For capacity to act)
(For lack of 
capacity to act)
Benefits of Formal Analysis
• Enables detecting and avoiding
unintended consequences.
– An earlier formalization preferred “certain“
conclusion from a relatively less trustworthy
source over “ambiguous“ conclusion from a
relatively more trustworthy source.
The whole problem with the world is 
that fools and fanatics are always so 
certain of themselves, but wiser people 
so full of doubts. — Betrand Russell
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Research Issues
• Determination of trust / influence from 
social networks
– Text analytics on communication 
–Analysis of network topology 
• E.g., follower relationship, friend relationship, etc.
• HOLY GRAIL: Direct Semantics in favor of 
Indirect Translations
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Research Issues : 
Credibility and Tweets
• Social Media is a source of News, means 
for tracking Diseases, and coordination in 
Disaster Scenarios
• But is fraught with Rumors (e.g., during  
Mumbai Bombings), Lies (e.g., during 
Boston Marathon Bombing), and Fakes 
(e.g., during Hurricane Sandy)
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Top 10 Credibility Indicators 
from Morris et al. [37]
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Feature Average Credibility Impact
Tweet is a RT from a trusted source 4.08
Author is an expert on the topic 4.04
Author is someone you follow 4.00
Contains URL you followed 3.93
Author is someone you have heard of 3.93
Author’s account is verified 3.92
Author often tweets on topic 3.74
Author has many tweets with similar content 3.71
Author uses personal photo as avatar 3.70
Author often mentioned and retweeted 3.69
Research Issues : 
Multimodal Integration
• Intelligent integration of mobile sensor 
and social data for situational awareness
– To exploit corroborative and 
complementary evidence provided by them
– To obtain qualitative and quantitative 
context
– To improve robustness and completeness
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Complementary and Corroborative 
Information
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Sensors observe 
slow moving 
traffic
Complementary 
information 
from social 
networks
Corroborative Evidence
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Evidence for 
reported 
observations
Interpersonal and Ecommerce 
Networks
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Research Issues
• Linguistic clues that betray 
trustworthiness 
• Experiments for gauging interpersonal 
trust in real world situations
– *Techniques and tools to detect and amplify 
useful signals in Self to more accurately predict 
trust and trustworthiness in Others
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*IARPA-TRUST program
Research Issues
• Other clues for gleaning trustworthiness
– Face (in photo) can effect  perceived 
trustworthiness and decision making
–Trust-inducing features of e-commerce 
sites can impact buyers
– Personal traits: religious beliefs, age, 
gullibility, benevolence, etc
– Nature of dyadic relationship
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Research Issues
• Study of cross-cultural differences in 
trustworthiness qualities and trust thresholds 
to better understand
– Influence 
• What aspects improve influence?
–Manipulation
• What aspects flag manipulation?
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Collaborative Systems :
Grid and P2P Computing  
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Research Issues
• Trust-aware resource management and 
scheduling
– Clients specify resource 
preferences/requirements/constraints
• Trust models for P2P systems
– To detect bad domains
– To detect bogus recommendations and attacks
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Azzedin and Maheshwaran,  2002-2003
Azzedin and Ridha, 2010
Bessis et al, 2011
Research Issues : Resilience
• Resiliency is the ability to maintain an
acceptable level of service even with
faults and challenges to normal operation.
• Coping with failures in computer systems
– Failed component stops working
– Failed component sends conflicting 
information to different parts of a system. 
(Byzantine Fault)
• Agreement in the presence of faults.
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Large Scale Graph Processing for
Scalable Implementation
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Pregel
• Scalable general-purpose graph processing 
system primarily designed for Google cluster.
• Inspired from Bulk Synchronous Parallel
Pregel: Anatomy of Superstep
• Read messages sent to vertex V in superstep S-1.
• Send messages to other vertices that will be 
delivered in superstep S+1.
• Modify the state of V and it’s outgoing edges
• Can change the graph topology by adding, 
deleting or modifying edges as well as vertices. 
Giraph
• Open source implementation of Pregel.
• Can be executed as a Hadoop job.
worker worker
Task Tracker
JobTracker
NameNode
ZooKeeper
worker worker
Task Tracker
worker worker
Task Tracker
master worker
Task Tracker
Giraph implementation leveraging Hadoop
Giraph API
• Vertex Implementation:
Bayesian Trust Management Framework : 
Multi-level Trust Metric
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Illustrating a General Approach
Quercia et al 2006
Josang and Haller 2007
Thirunarayan et al 2012
Outline
• Motivation : Multi-level trust management
• Mathematical Foundation: Dirichlet 
Distribution
• Implementation and Behavior Details:
– Local Trust Data Structures
– Trust Formation
– Bayesian Trust Evolution
• Analysis of Robustness to Attacks: Security 
• Evaluation: Example trace vs. experiment
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Motivation
• Uses K-level discrete trust metric
– E.g., Amazon’s 5-star trust metric can be
interpreted as signifying (very untrustworthy,
untrustworthy, neutral, trustworthy, very
trustworthy) or (very dissatisfied, dissatisfied,
neutral, satisfied, very satisfied).
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Approach
• Multi-level trust management approach
formalizes a distributed, robust,
lightweight, computational trust that
takes into account context, subjectivity,
and time.
• Applies Dirichlet distribution, a
generalization of Beta-distribution.
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Dirichlet Distribution
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K-level Trust Metric
• K-level trust probability vector:
x = (x1, . . ., xK) 
where (x1 + . . . + xK = 1). 
• Example: If a 5-star rating system has 50 people
giving 5-stars, 20 people giving 4-stars, 5 people
giving 3-stars, 5 people giving 2-stars, and 20 people
giving 1-star, then the 5-level trust metric probability
vector is (0.5,0.2,0.05,0.05,0.2).
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Trust and Experience 
• Experience is a realization of the latent trust, 
and helps predicting trust.
• Probability of an experience-level sequence,           
with a1 - 1 counts of level 1 experience, …, aK - 1 
counts of level K experience is: 
* ( (a1 +…+ aK – K) ! / (a1-1 ! *…* aK-1 !) )
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Dirichlet Distribution
• The Dirichlet distribution is the probability
density function for x = (x1, . . ., xK)
given (a1,…,aK):
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Why use Dirichlet Distribution?
• If the prior distribution of x is uniform, then
the Dirichlet family of distribution shown
below gives posterior distribution of x after
ai-1 occurrences of level i experience with
probability xi, for each i in [1, K]:
June 1, 2015 Trust Management: T. K. Prasad 170
Why use Dirichlet Distribution?
• Dirichlet distribution is a conjugate prior for
multinomial distribution.
• Consequence:
– Estimated distribution updated for a new experience
at level i, by just incrementing ai parameter.
– In contrast: If prior distribution is different from
Dirichlet, then it is conceptually hard to comprehend
and computationally inefficient to compute posterior
distribution, in general.
– Icing on the cake: Uniform distribution (signifying
ignorance) is Dirichlet!
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Dirichlet distribution is a conjugate prior 
for multinomial distribution. 
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Visualizing Dirichlet Distribution (K=3): 
Color Density plot on 2D simplex 
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Dynamic Trustworthiness
• Best estimate of trust for Dir(a1,...,aK) (gleaned
from (ai-1) experiences at level i, for all i in [1,K])
is the mean vector (a1/a0,…,aK/a0), and the
associated confidence is the variance vector.
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Implementation and Behavior Details
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Local Data Structures
• To store relevant information to compute
direct (functional) and indirect (referral) trust.
• Each node maintains locally, for each peer and
each context, four vectors of length K.
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Local Data Structures
• Direct Trust Vector: Peers X Contexts X Peers -> Probability-Vector-K
• dtv(px,c,py) = (d1,d2,…,dK)
• Direct Experience Matrix: Peers X Contexts X Peers -> Count-Vector-K
• dem(px,c,py) = (ec1, ec2,…,ecK)
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Local Data Structures
• Recommended Trust Vector: Peers X Contexts X Peers -> Probability-
Vector-K
• rtv(px,c,py) = (r1,r2,…,rK)
• Sent Recommendation Matrix: Peers X Contexts X Peers -> Count-Vector-K
• srm(px,c,py) = (sr1, sr2,…,srK)
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Local Data Structures
• Initialization: To reflect complete
ignorance via uniform distribution, we
set the probability vectors dtv and rtv to
(1/K,…,1/K), and the elements of the
count vector dem and srm to (0,…,0).
• These are Dirichlet distributed in the
limiting case where ai’s are 1.
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Trust Formation
• Overall trust vector is weighted sum of direct
trust vector and recommended trust vector.
• Weights determined using
– Objective confidence values using variance
(deviation from the mean)
– Subjective relative preference for direct
experience over recommendations
• Dependence on recommended trust yet to be explored
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Trust Decision
• Assuming that trust-level scale is linear, the
trust distribution vector (d1,d2,…,dK) can be
mapped to the closed interval [0,1], or to
consolidated trust level, in order to act.
• Trust threshold should be determined based
on the context and risk tolerance.
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Trust Evolution
• Direct/recommended trust vectors are updated
for a new experience/received recommendation.
• Key Idea: Dirichlet distribution is the conjugate
prior of the multinomial distribution. So it is
adequate to maintain counts of direct experience
and sent recommendations, to best estimate
direct trust and recommended trust vectors
respectively.
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Trust Evolution
• Simple Scheme (Direct Trust)
For a new experience at level i,
dem(px,c,py) = (ec1,…,ecK) becomes
demnew(px,c,py) = (ec1,…, eci+1,…,ecK)
and dtv(px,c,py) becomes
dtvnew(px,c,py) = (d1,d2,…,dK)
where di = eci+1 / (ec1 + … + eck+1) and
dj = ecj / (ec1 + … + eck+1)
for each j in [1,K] and j =/= i.
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Trust Evolution
• Robust Scheme
To incorporate differential aging of experience
counts as a function of their level (and to
incorporate “long term memory for low-level
experience and short term memory for high-
level experience”), we use a decay vector
(l1,…,lK), where 1 >= l1 >= … >= lK > 0, that
modifies update rule as:
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Trust Evolution
• Robust Scheme (Direct Trust)
For a new experience at level i,
dem(px,c,py) = (ec1,…,ecK) becomes
demnew(px,c,py) = (ec1,…, eci + 1,…,ecK).
For every clock tick (with context-based delay),
dem(px,c,py) = (ec1,…,ecK) becomes
demnew(px,c,py) = (l1*ec1,…, lK*ecK)
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Trust Evolution
• Robust Scheme (Direct Trust)
For every clock unit and new experience,
dtv(px,c,py) becomes
dtvnew(px,c,py) = (d1,d2,…,dK)
where di = eci / (ec1 + … + eck)
for each i in [1,K].
• Subtlety: Experience counts should saturate at
1 rather than diminish to 0 with time. (See code)
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Trust Evolution Illustrated
Experience Sequence
Final Trust Distribution 
(Simple Scheme)
Final Trust Distribution 
(Robust Scheme)
[1,1,1] (0.57,0.14,0.14,0.14)
(0.55,0.15,0.15,0.15)
[1,4,1,4] (0.375,0.125,0.125,0.375)
(0.42,0.14,0.14,0.29)
[1,1,4,4,4,4,1,1] (0.42,0.08,0.08,0.42)
(0.5,0.1,0.1,0.3)
[1,1,4,4,4,4,1,1,1] (0.53,0.07,0.07,0.33)
(0.64,0.1,0.1,0.17)
[2,3,2,3] (0.125,0.375,0.375,0.125)
(0.14,0.29,0.42,0.14)
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Trust Evolution Illustrated
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Experience 
Sequence Value
Trust Distribution Trace 
(Simple Scheme)
Trust Distribution Trace 
(Robust Scheme)
Beta-PDF
(cf.  n =2)
(0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25) (0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25) 0.5
1 (0.4,0.2,0.2,0.2) (0.4,0.2,0.2,0.2) 0.33
1 (0.5,0.17,0.17,0.17) (0.53,0.165,0.155,0.15) 0.25
1 (0.57,0.14,0.14,0.14) (0.55,0.15,0.15,0.15) 0.2
n (0.5,0.125,0.125,0.25) (0.5,0.13,0.12,0.25) 0.33
n (0.44,0.11,0.11,0.33) (0.46,0.135,0.135,0.27) 0.43
n (0.4,0.1,0.1,0.4) (0.42,0.12,0.11,0.35) 0.5
n (0.36,0.1,0.1,0.45) (0.37,0.12,0.12,0.38) 0.55
1 (0.42,0.08,0.08,0.41) (0.47,0.11,0.11,0.31) 0.5
1 (0.46,0.08,0.08,0.38) (0.53,0.11,0.11,0.24) 0.45
1 (0.5,0.07,0.07,0.35) (0.6,0.1,0.1,0.2) 0.41
1 (0.53,0.07,0.07,0.33) (0.65,0.1,0.1,0.14) 0.38
n (0.5,0.0625,0.0625,0.375) (0.6,0.1,0.1,0.2) 0.43
1 (0.53,0.06,0.06,0.35) (0.64,0.1,0.1,0.17) 0.4
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Analysis and Robustness Issues
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Salient Properties
• Symmetry
– Simple Scheme is symmetric w.r.t.
trust/experience levels while Robust
Scheme is asymmetric because of non-
uniform decay.
– Experience levels are “preserved” in that
extreme/controversial behavior (credulous
interpretation) is treated differently from
ignorance (skeptical interpretation).
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Salient Properties
• Effect of Order of Experience
– Simple Scheme is sensitive to the counts of
various experience levels, but not to the order of
experience.
– Robust Scheme is sensitive to the order of
experience.
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Salient Properties
• Differential Aging of experience levels
• It exhibits limited and selective
memory.
–It retains low-level experiences
much longer than high-level
experiences.
»Parameters: Decay rate and
saturation
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Related Work on Multi-level Trust 
with Applications
The described approach is similar to Dirichlet Reputation 
System [Josang-Haller, 2007].
Applications:
• Browser toolbar for clients  to see the user ratings and 
for users to provide ratings  (critical surfer model) 
[Josang-Haller, 2007]
• Evaluating partners in Collaborative Environments 
[Yang and Cemerlic, 2009]
• Formalizing Multi-Dimensional Contracts [Reece, et al, 
2007]
• In Collaborative Intrusion Detection System [Fung et al, 
2011 ]
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Conclusion
• Provided simple examples of trust (Why?)
• Explained salient features of trust (What?)
• Showed  examples of gleaning trustworthiness  
(How?)
• Touched upon research challenges in the 
context of sensor, social, and interpersonal 
networks.
• Described multi-level trust management in 
detail
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Thank You!
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(Collaborators: 
Pramod Anantharam, Dr. Cory Henson, Professor Amit Sheth, 
Dharan Kumar Althuru, Jacob Ross)
(Key Reference: 
K Thirunarayan, et al. : Comparative Trust Management with Applications: 
Bayesian Aapproaches Emphasis. Future Generation Comp. Syst. 31: 182-199 (2014))
[Course:  http://cecs.wright.edu/~tkprasad/courses/cs7600/cs7600.html]
